Delegating Information Security Governance Work to Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Agents: Delegability Criteria, Autonomy Levels, and Accountability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37497/opsbrazil.44Keywords:
Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Agents, Information Security Governance, InformArtificial Intelligence Governance, Automation, Identity And Access Management, Human Oversight, Accountability, Autonomy LevelsResumo
The increasing adoption of autonomous artificial intelligence agents in corporate environments is redefining the boundaries between human work and automated execution in information security governance. Activities such as access reviews, request handling, compliance evidence collection, alert triage, and inventory updates involve significant operational components; however, their automation raises a governance question that is not adequately addressed by the binary distinction between manual and automated work: what degree of autonomy is admissible for a given task, and under what conditions can such delegation remain accountable, auditable, and defensible? This article proposes a task-based model for determining the admissible degree of delegation of information security governance activities to autonomous artificial intelligence agents. The model considers five attributes: criterion determinism, outcome verifiability, effect reversibility, regulatory consequence, and the cost of error at scale. These attributes are associated with five delegation levels, ranging from human execution to autonomous execution with exception-based control. Progression between levels is conditioned on measured and stable divergence between agent decisions and human decisions rather than on perceptions of technological maturity. The model is examined through a single case study conducted in a medium-sized Brazilian organization. During calibration, divergence between agent-proposed decisions and human decisions was 14%, decreasing to 3% after the decision criteria stabilized. Average resolution time also decreased from approximately 48 hours to approximately 10 minutes. The findings provide preliminary empirical evidence supporting the proposition that autonomy should be assigned according to task characteristics and demonstrated performance, while accountability remains linked to an identifiable human owner.
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